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FROZEN DOCUMENT — FROZEN__TEST__PAIR__FIRST__OUTAGE__01 · SHA-256 bfde4c87960b9c24570644626eacd029a489a158eae8c41ee38982086a699e1f
FROZEN TEST — PAIR-FIRST OUTAGE — 01
Version: 01 · Frozen: 2026-11-18 (America/Chicago) · Status: FROZEN Freeze rule: this version never changes. Any revision is a new version number, published as a new document. A copy whose SHA-256 differs from the filed hash is not this version; the filed hash is carried in the Ecosystem KV filing record and in GitHub notices StegVerse-Labs/.github #3443 / #3472 of 2026-11-18. Authority: NONE — coordination/test record only. Running this test admits nothing, settles nothing by itself, and certifies nothing; it produces evidence a reader can check.
The question
When the network drops at the moment of a paid crossing, what does your framework do?
A verify-first system reads chain or facilitator state before it can complete a crossing, so an outage defers the crossing itself. A pair-first system decides on locally-decidable evidence, issues its proof at the crossing, and settles when the network answers. This test discriminates between the two — and it discriminates hardest at Step 4, where the only thing standing between a framework and a double settlement is a nonce, or an equivalent replay registry the framework keeps itself.
Parameters (modeled on the reference run)
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Network | Base (eip155:8453) |
| Asset | USDC 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 |
| Payment scheme | x402 "exact", EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization, single-use authorization nonce (bytes32) |
| Crossing | Full evaluation — governance fee 15,000 µUSDC (US$0.015) plus a settlement charge quoted at challenge time |
| Reference crossing totals | 16,702 µUSDC and 16,697 µUSDC (fee + live-quoted settlement charge) |
| Payee | Fixed, server-side, stated in the challenge; the payer cannot redirect it |
A runner may substitute its own network, asset, and amounts. State every substitution in the report. The structure — a signed, single-use authorization presented to a system that then loses its network — is the test; the chain is not.
Setup
- Stand up the system under test in its normal production configuration.
- Fund a payer under your own custody. Verify custody before funding (key file permissions, address re-derivation, test signature).
- Let the system obtain whatever live quotes or prices its crossing requires, so it holds a current quote when the outage begins. (A system that has never obtained a quote may fail closed on pricing alone. That is a different result — report it as such, do not score it as Step 3.)
- Obtain one valid, unused payment authorization for the crossing amount.
The five steps
Step 1 — Obtain the authorization. As in Setup 4: a valid signed authorization, nonce unused, amount equal to the quoted crossing total.
Step 2 — Cut the network. The system under test loses all egress to chain RPC endpoints, explorers, and any facilitator it consults. Local storage, local signing, and local records remain available. Nothing else changes.
Step 3 — Present the authorization (the crossing). Expected, pair-first: the crossing completes offline. The system decides on locally-decidable predicates — signature recovery, receptor and amount match against its own offer, validity window, and the authorization's nonce checked against the system's own records — issues its proof (the receipt record) with settlement marked pending, and returns its disposition to the payer. Expected, verify-first: the crossing cannot complete, because the verification read has nowhere to go.
Step 4 — Re-present the SAME authorization, still offline. Expected: refused, locally, from the system's own records, with no network read. The refusal is itself recorded. This is the step the nonce decides: the system must distinguish "the same payment again" from "a new payment" using only what it holds.
Step 5 — Restore the network. Expected: settlement completes exactly once. The on-chain amount equals the crossing total exactly. The Step 3 disposition does not change; the settlement outcome is appended to the record, never rewritten into it. A full replay/recompute of the system's record verifies end-to-end, including the outage-period entries.
Result-reporting table (fill in and publish)
| Step | Result (PASS/FAIL) | Evidence (record id / tx hash / error returned) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Authorization obtained | |||
| 2. Network cut (egress to chain/facilitator confirmed down) | |||
| 3. Crossing presented offline | |||
| 4. Same authorization re-presented offline | |||
| 5. Network restored — settlement | |||
| 5b. Full record replay/recompute |
Scoring
PASS requires all three: Step 3 completes offline AND Step 4 is refused from local state AND Step 5 settles exactly once.
Every other combination is a FAIL, named by its mode:
- Step 3 fails → availability failure: downtime is a lost crossing.
- Step 4 accepted → replay failure: the same authorization can settle twice.
- Step 5 settles zero times or more than once → settlement integrity failure.
- Step 4 refused only by consulting a facilitator's or the chain's state after reconnection → scored as a Step 4 FAIL: the registry was someone else's, and during the outage the framework held nothing that could refuse.
Without a nonce
If the payment instrument carries no nonce — no unique, single-use, locally checkable replay token — Step 4 is undecidable from local state. The framework cannot tell a re-presentation from a new payment without reading state the outage has taken away. Its options are the three failure modes above: refuse Step 3 (availability failure), accept Step 4 (replay failure), or stall both until reconnection (the crossing is deferred — which is the verify-first result this test exists to expose). A hosted facilitator's nonce registry does not cure this: it is a read, and Step 2 removes reads. The registry has to be the framework's own, derived from its own record of what it has already accepted.
Reference result — 0R10N15-8374 (StegVerse 8374, production)
Run against the production grammar, 2026-11-18:
- Outage battery (
outage_battery.py, SHA-256 prefixd55e208das recorded in the build record): 8/8, run twice — no-quote fail-closed; quote persisted; blackholed crossing ALLOW with pair written PENDING under a stale-quote flag; nonce re-presentation refused locally (422 PAYMENT_NONCE_REUSED); on restore, the sweep settled on-chain exactly (run 2: tx0x5a0b586e8624290e0599a1c74dc2f6455852bb188cf6aaa24516c9002d7e3112, block 59301533); replay MATCH including the outage pairs; terminal-failure case receipted as its own appended record. - Production crossings on the pair-first path: PAIR-000049, born PENDING, settled tx
0x6fac4964f1a4d0e44e5189d6f8a6ac50eabd46b516d463da0d5eb07d00bd9b77, block 59302294, 16,702 µUSDC exact. PAIR-000054, born PENDING → PAIR-000055 SETTLED, tx0x9fda13264a261f00d5fe2aed00af86e15def11c4f3a13b06831575d91c445f40, block 59304079, 16,697 µUSDC. - Chain state at the reference run: 55 pairs, replay MATCH, terminal anchor
3a8046e39b000d708b83a0b41a5ba6ee3d333761a8c1c5f9c5a40914e133b46d. - Build record: PAIR__FIRST__BUILD__RECORD__01.md, Ecosystem KV Drive
1Q7ffEc03NdGA57zw-U787C2hM251566s.
Inspect the live system — one link: https://8374.stegverse.org/inspect Live chain verdict and anchor, settled pairs with their on-chain transactions, current balance, and the determination block: which claims the evidence supports and which it does not.
Running it
Run it against your own framework, your own funds, testnet or mainnet — state which. Publish the filled table wherever you publish your work. A result reported without the Step 4 evidence is a claim, not a run.
— END OF FROZEN DOCUMENT —
Submit your result
If you run it: link the test page in your published results. Posting on LinkedIn? Link StegVerse — https://www.linkedin.com/company/stegverse/. And send a link to your published work to stegverse@stegverse.org — results sent in get added to the comparison table at the comparison table on this site.
Patent pending (U.S. Prov. App. No. 64/198,910) · StegVerse LLC · 8374@StegVerse.ai